Introduction
The relevance of collaborative research networks has been highlighted in the literature on innovation economics. The development of new products and processes in firms largely depends on the firms' ability to build networks and partnerships as a way to incorporate external knowledge for innovation (Lundvall, 1988 (Lundvall, , 2007 Tether, 2002; Powell and Grodal, 2005; Vega-Jurado et al., 2009; Trigo and Vence, 2011) . Specifically, collaborative agreements have become a strategy of knowledge sharing and transfer across firms which is largely recognised as an important (quasi-market) mechanism to access such external knowledge (Schilling, 2008) .
It is becoming increasingly important for firms to cooperate with other organizations to carry out their R&D activities. According to the Community Innovation Survey, the percentage of cooperative innovative firms in EU members increased from 25% in 2004 to 31% in 2012
( Figure 1 ). In particular, Spain, despite its low proportion of cooperative firms, presents one of the highest increases in such proportion, from 18% in 2004 to 29% in 2012. Indeed, from a policy perspective, an important part of EU and national public funding for R&D is addressed at stimulating cooperation between firms, and between firms and public institutions (López, 2008) . The European Commission, for instance, recognizes partnerships between businesses, public entities and knowledge institutions as essential for success (European Commission, 2012 ).
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
Given the relevance and the growing interest of both academics and policy-makers in this phenomenon, the main objective of this paper is to examine the determinants in the choice of different R&D cooperation partners as a strategy to carry out innovation activities. Although a growing number of studies have analysed the motivations of cooperation in R&D according to its various forms, namely, with suppliers and/or customers, research institutions and competitors (Tether, 2002; Miotti and Sachwald, 2003; López, 2008; Arranz and Arroyabe, 2008; Segarra-Blasco and Arauzo-Carod, 2008; Abramovsky et al., 2009) , less attention has been paid to the possible interrelation between these different types. The evidence shows that firms make simultaneous agreements with different types of partners (Belderbos et al., 2004 (Belderbos et al., , 2006 , and consequently, the decisions on the type of cooperation partner may not be independent from each other. In this paper we will therefore study how the motivations for carrying out R&D cooperation agreements may differ according to the type of partnership chosen while controlling for the possible correlation between such R&D cooperation strategies.
Additionally, most of the previous empirical literature on the determinants of R&D cooperation rarely considers the service sector in their analyses, either because of lack of data or because services have long been considered to innovate scarcely. However, given the current increasing importance of this sector in most industrialized countries and the distinct nature of the innovative processes between manufacturing and service firms (Hoffman et al., 1998; Vega-Jurado et al., 2009 ) we explore and deep on the differences between manufacturing and service firms in relation to the driving factors forcing the formation of cooperation agreements.
We use data from the Technological Innovation Panel (PITEC), a comprehensive database of Spanish companies which mainly provides information on innovative activities. The longitudinal structure of the PITEC database allows us to perform a cross-section analysis taking into account the simultaneity bias inherent in this kind of analysis via the inclusion of lagged explanatory variables as well as via corrections for endogeneity through a control function approach.
After this introduction, Section 2 proceeds with the literature review. Section 3 describes the database and shows some descriptive statistics. Section 4 details the estimation methodology and Section 5 presents the empirical results. Finally, we present the major conclusions.
Literature Review
The literature on industrial organization emphasizes knowledge spillovers, both incoming and outgoing, as main determinants of R&D cooperation (Katz, 1986; D'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Kamien et al., 1992) . Incoming spillovers are the flows of external knowledge that a firm is able to capture, while outgoing spillovers reflect the firm's ability to control the knowledge that flows outside it. The idea is that in order to internalize the information flows that may occur in the processes of innovation, and in order to manage these flows more effectively, firms decide to participate in cooperative agreements. But, do they do it differently depending on the type of partnership?
In an empirical study using data from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) for Belgian industrial companies, Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) find that incoming spillovers and the firm's ability to appropriate returns from innovations have a positive and significant effect on the probability of R&D cooperation of any kind. These authors also show that the larger the incoming spillovers, the greater the likelihood of cooperation with research institutions and universities but that the extent of incoming spillovers has no effect on cooperation with suppliers and customers. Similar results are found in Cassiman (2005), López (2008) , Abramovsky et al. (2009) , Serrano-Bedia et al. (2010) and Chun and Mun (2012) .
With regard to outgoing spillovers it is concluded that a greater ability to appropriate the results of innovation through protection increases the likelihood of vertical cooperation and has no effect on agreements with research institutions. However, some works also argue that an excessive protection may hinder the internalization of the flows shared by the partners and may thus have a negative effect on R&D cooperation in general (Hernán et al., 2003; López, 2008) .
Another determinant of R&D cooperation strategies, which is related to the flows of knowledge, is the firm's absorptive capacity. As point out by Cohen and Levinthal (1989) the absorptive capacity is required to assimilate and exploit knowledge in the environment; a company with more absorptive capacity is able to access a greater amount of knowledge than another with lower capacity, and will derive greater benefit from cooperation agreements in R&D. Absorptive capacity has been identified by many studies as an important feature of the firms that are more likely to cooperate (Bayona et al., 2001; Fritsch and Lukas, 2001; Miotti and Sachwald, 2003; Hernán et al., 2003; Belderbos et al., 2004; Röller et al., 2007; Arranz and Arroyave, 2008) . However, distinguishing between types of cooperation, there is no clear conclusion of the effect of internal R&D effort on the decision to take part in cooperation of one type or another. Miotti and Sachwald (2003) , using data for France, found a significant positive impact on the likelihood of agreements with research institutions and found no effect on the probability of vertical cooperation, but López (2008)'s conclusion for Spain was the opposite.
According to the strategic management literature, companies use research alliances with the idea of accessing complementary knowledge such as, market knowledge or qualified personnel, or in order to share risks or costs of R&D activities (Hagedoorn, 1993) . However, empirical studies show mixed results regarding the effects of these factors on R&D cooperation (Chun and Mun, 2012) . Sakakibara (1997) shows that access to complementary knowledge is one of the main motivations for cooperating in R&D. Bayona et al. (2001) report that both risks and costs of innovation activities are significant determinants of cooperation. In contrast, Miotti and Sachwald (2003) find that neither of these factors influence the likelihood of cooperation. Distinguishing between R&D cooperation according to type of partner, Belderbos et al. (2004) finds that the risk factors involved in innovation positively affect the likelihood of cooperation with competitors and suppliers, while costsharing is only relevant for the decision to cooperate with research institutions.
By distinguishing between different types of cooperation, Arranz and Arroyabe (2008) , for the case of Spain, analyse the determinants of cooperation from a resource-based perspective.
For example, they argue that firm size has a negative effect on cooperation with universities:
that is, smaller firms tend to cooperate more with universities due to their limited technological resources. In this sense it is argued that firms need to have certain structure and resources to be able to face the commitment required in parnerships and to benefit from cooperation agreements. Likewise, following this line of thinking, these authors find evidence supporting the idea that when firms obtain public R&D subsidies they may be more likely to establish cooperation agreements with another firm or with institutions given that this way they have the resources to do the research. Among others, Miotti and Sachwald (2003) , Belderbos et al. (2004) , Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2008) and Abramovsky et al. (2009) also provide evidence supporting this argument.
Most empirical analyses have assumed that the strategies of cooperation with different types of partners in R&D activities are independent; however, the existence of simultaneous agreements with different partners may suggest that there are interrelations between such strategies which should be taken into account. Belderbos et al. (2004) , using data from the Dutch Community Innovation Survey, apply a multivariate probit model which accounts for possible systematic correlations between the different cooperation strategies (competitors, suppliers, customers and research institutions). They supported the notion of interdependence between the different cooperation decisions, which may be due to complementarities in R&D cooperation strategies but also to omitted firm-specific factors affecting all types of cooperation.
In regard to sectoral differences in the determinants of R&D cooperation, Abramovsky et al.
(2009) provides some evidence on the heterogeneity in the motivation for R&D collaboration agreements across sectors. They obtain that cooperation is less frequent in manufactures which could be related to the fact that in such sector legal protection methods are used more intensively. As a direct consequence, one could think that a greater use of protection methods has a lower impact on R&D cooperation in the service sector than in manufacturing.
However, Serrano-Bedia et al. (2010) , who only analyse institutional cooperation for Spanish firms, find that legal protection is not statistically significant neither in the manufacturing nor in the service sector, so that certain ambiguity of the effect of appropriability seems to be there. Another interesting difference found in Abramovsky et al. (2009) refers to the impact of internal R&D intensity on cooperation which appears to be clearer in the service sector, implying that internal and external R&D might be substitutes in such sector, at a greater extent than in manufactures. However, Serrano-Bedia et al. (2010) provided evidence of a positive relationship between absorptive capacity and the incentives to cooperate both in manufactures and services in the Spanish case.
Data and Descriptive Analysis
The database used in this study is the Technological Innovation Panel (PITEC) 1 , a panel produced jointly by the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE), the Spanish Foundation for Science and Technology (FECYT) and the Cotec Foundation, with information on innovative activity of Spanish companies. PITEC is a survey carried out yearly and the questions about cooperation are asked in a 3-year period. The advantage of using this database is that it allows partial control over potential endogeneity problems inherent in this kind of analysis by introducing lags in the explanatory variables. Specifically, the variables for R&D cooperation The PITEC sample in 2008 contains information on 12813 businesses, but after a cleaning of the data 3 and selecting only the firms of manufacturing and services, the figure falls to 10443.
Moreover, since the aim of this paper is to study R&D cooperation, and since only firms engaged in innovation respond to the questions relevant to cooperation, the analysis is restricted to the group of innovative companies. 4 Finally, our sample comprises 7362 companies. Table A1 in the Appendix provides more information on the selection of the sample.
PITEC asks firms which kind of partner they cooperated with in their innovation processes. [Insert Table 1 around here]
The proportion of innovative companies with the diverse types of cooperation agreements and according to the two sectors under consideration is shown in Table 2 . As it can be seen, there is a higher proportion of innovative companies in the industrial sector (80.9%) than in the service sector (61.3%). However, the propensity to cooperate is higher in the service sector:
40% of innovative companies in this sector have cooperation agreements with other partners, compared to 31% in the industrial sector. This may be related to the fact that manufacturing firms use legal protection methods more intensively and then, they do not need to cooperate to have a secure atmosphere where to carry out innovation activities. That is, cooperation may act as a substitute to legal protection through patenting. On the contrary, it seems that the formal protection methods used in the service sector, more relying in trademarks and copyright would not be working as a substitute to R&D cooperation activities. (Goeree and Helland, 2010) . We might expect incentives to cheat to be stronger within cooperation agreements with competitor firms, leading to horizontal cooperation being less frequent and even less in the manufacturing sector, where competition tends to be higher (Abramovsky et al., 2009 ). On the other hand, procompetitive benefits from R&D collaborations, such as shared risks, alleviated financial constraints and shared costs could not be achieved large enough to compensate anticompetitive effects of collusion (Gugler and Siebert, 2007) .
[Insert Table 2 around here] Table 3 presents statistics on the characteristics of the companies engaged in cooperation and according to the types of agreement involved. It appears that innovative firms that engage in cooperation agreements are more likely to place higher importance on incoming spillovers and to receive public funding than those which do not cooperate; they also tend to have a higher mean of internal R&D intensity, and use some form of legal protection at a higher rate.
A conclusion which is consistent in both sectors. [Insert Table 3 around here]
Finally, Table 3 shows that the differences in the characteristics of cooperative firms are minimal according to the type of cooperation partner, except that companies involved in horizontal cooperation have higher mean of internal R&D intensity and are more likely to have received some public financial support for their innovation activities in the case of the industrial sector.
Estimation Procedure

Method of estimation
We define three binary dependent variables for each of our three types of cooperation:
horizontal, vertical and institutional cooperation. In order to identify the determinants of the decisions to participate in the different forms of cooperation, we specify and estimate a multivariate probit model that accounts for systematic correlation among the different decisions to cooperate. As noted in the previous section, the different cooperation strategies chosen by the firms are not mutually exclusive, which may imply that the choice of diverse types of partners is not independent from each other. Additionally, such systematic correlation may account for unobserved factors affecting all equations, so that estimating separate (probit) equations would lead to inefficient estimations (Zellner and Haung, 1962 ).
Although we had other estimation alternatives, we considered them not to be suitable. For instance, Kaiser (2002) estimates a nested logit model which assumes a sequential process in which firms initially decide whether to cooperate or not and, in a second step, they decide the type of cooperation partner. However, this approach does not take into account that firms can simultaneously engage multiple types of cooperation agreements. Additionally, a multinomial logit approach should consider all the potential excluding alternatives of cooperation, which are the eight alternatives shown in Table 1 . This type of multinomial choice modelling has several weaknesses: it has too many parameters and it is difficult to interpret, and the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption is likely to be violated given that the decisions of cooperation between the different types of partners are interdependent (McFadden, 1974) .
We have three latent variables, costs that company i obtains by cooperating in R&D with competitors, with suppliers and/or customers, and with research institutions, respectively. Assuming that these differences depend linearly on a set of firm and sectoral characteristics, contained in x, we have:
where j β is a vector of parameters including the constant term and ij ε are error terms distributed as a normal multivariate, each with mean zero and a variance-covariance matrix V,
where V has values of 1 on the leading diagonal and correlations kj jk ρ ρ = (k=1, 2, 3) as offdiagonal elements.
Since the latent variables are not directly observable and only their signs can be accounted for, binary variables are defined that summarize the signs as the choice made by firms for each type of partner. Thus, the multivariate probit model specifies the binary variables as follows:
In this case, with three equations, there are eight joint probabilities corresponding to the eight combinations of different types of partners for cooperation and non-cooperation (as given in Table 1 ). The possible probabilities are determined by (Wooldridge, 2002; Capellari and Jenkins, 2003; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Greene, 2008) :
where (.) Φ is the normal trivariate distribution function, q n =1 if y in =1 and q n =-1 if y in =0 for n=1, 2, 3. These probabilities are the basis for the maximum likelihood estimation, which is carried out using the routine developed by Cappellari and Jenkins (2003) who use simulation methods of the maximum likelihood function, specifically the GHK (Geweke-HajivassiliouKeane) simulator to calculate the probabilities.
Variables
Bearing in mind the literature review presented above, among the reasons leading firms to engage in collaborative innovative activity, in this paper we focus on the roles of incoming spillovers and legal protection, cooperation as a means of overcoming constraints (i.e. risks, costs and lack of qualified personnel), the absorptive capacity of the firm and the receipt of public funding for innovation. We also control for some firm's characteristics such as firm size, belonging to a group of enterprises and sectoral dummy variables indicating the sector to which the firm belongs to. Although all these variables are listed and defined in Table 4 , we make here some clarifications.
6 Note that firms can choose not to cooperate in all cases.
Incoming spillovers are measured by the importance that the firm attributed, on a four-point scale, to publicly available information for the innovation process of the firm. The information sources were conferences, trade fairs, exhibitions, scientific journals and trade/technical publications, professional and industry associations. To generate a firmspecific measure of incoming spillovers, we aggregated these answers by summing the scores on each of these questions and then the variable was rescaled from 0 (unimportant) to 1 (crucial). Firms that rate generally available external information sources as more important inputs to their innovation process are expected to be more likely to be actively engaged in cooperative R&D agreements. With the same survey data, we also computed the variable proxying for legal protection, which considers whether the firm used at least one legal method for protecting inventions or innovations (patents, registered an industrial design, trademark or copyright), taking a value of 1 if used, and 0 otherwise. There is not a consensus on the impact of such variable on cooperation, as surveyed in section 2. Although we could have considered other proxies for these spillover variables, we have followed Cassiman and
Veugelers (2002) who pointed that the advantage of the ones suggested here is that they are direct and firm-specific, allowing for heterogeneity among firms.
Other motives for engaging in cooperative R&D, such as cost-and risk-sharing and access to qualified personnel, have been proxied through the rates the firm attributed to the different obstacles to innovation: the uncertain demand for innovative goods or services (Risks), the lack of funds within the enterprise or lack of finance from sources outside the enterprise or the consideration that innovation costs are too high (Costs) and the lack of qualified personnel (Lack of HK). In the three cases, the variables were rescaled from 0 (unimportant) to 1 (crucial). This way, when costs, risks or lack of personnel are an important obstacle to innovation, we expect to observe more cooperative R&D agreements for the purpose of cost-, risk-and personnel-sharing.
Absorptive capacity as well as the firm's internal innovative activity is captured through the ratio between the intramural R&D expenditure and turnover (R&D intensity). Firm size (<50 employees, 50-249, 250-499 and >500), public funding of innovation and belonging to a group are binary dummy variables, taking the value 1 if the firm belongs to the corresponding size range, has received any kind of public funding (local, regional or national) and belongs to a group of companies, respectively, and zero otherwise. Finally, we included dummy variables for the sector, which we assume will pick up unobserved sectoral-specific attributes that contribute to the decision of a firm to enter into an R&D cooperative agreement.
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[Insert Table 4 around here]
As the coefficients of multivariate probit models cannot be directly interpreted, we calculated the marginal effects on the unconditional expectations of the dependent variables. The marginal effect of an explanatory variable, x ij , on the unconditional expectation of a dependent variable, y ij , shows the impact of such explanatory variable on the propensity to engage in any kind of cooperation unconditional to another cooperation adopted by the firm.
We present the marginal effects calculated at the mean marginal effect over all observations. 
Addressing the problem of endogeneity
One problem in our estimation procedure refers to the possible endogeneity of some explanatory variables mainly due to simultaneity in the decision to engage in R&D cooperation agreements. In fact, both theoretical literature on Industrial Organization and most empirical literature, have signalled that the extent to which firms benefit from incoming spillovers, the extent to which they can appropriate the returns to their innovative activity and the amount of resources devoted to R&D can themselves depend on whether or not firms engage in cooperation agreements (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Belderbos et al., 2004; López, 2008) . We next explain the potential endogeneity of these three variables.
Incoming spillovers may be affected by R&D cooperation activities because firms may use these agreements to manage external knowledge flows and because the ability to create incoming spillovers from the general pool of knowledge can be a function of other innovation activities of the firm such as participation in cooperative agreements. Also, cooperating firms may try to maximize incoming spillovers among partners through information sharing, which will enhance the stability of cooperation. At the same time, firms that cooperate tend to protect their proprietary knowledge. In other words, we expect that firms engaged in cooperation agreements have an incentive to become more successful at controlling 7 We include a binary sector variable (1=manufactures and 0=services) in the model for the whole sample and industry dummies at 2-digit level according to NACE-93 in the separate models for manufactures and services. 8 A more detailed explanation of several types of marginal effects can be found in Sodjinou and Henningsen (2012) .
information sharing with their partners, as well as limiting free-riding by nonpartners. On the other hand, since cooperation R&D agreements may make internal expenditures more effective, R&D intensity can be influenced by such agreements.
Following the reasoning above and thanks to the availability of two different waves from our database, we lagged explanatory variables in order to limit the simultaneity bias inherent to this kind of studies, enabling us to overcome an important limitation in most previous studies.
However, this approach only reduces the bias but does not correct for it. 9 Therefore, we attempt to deal with this potential endogeneity through a two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) method (Terza et al., 2008) . More generally this method is called a control function approach (Rivers and Vuong, 1988; Wooldridge, 2002) , which has been shown to be consistent in nonlinear models. In a nutshell, the first stage consists of the estimation of the residuals from the regression of the potential endogenous variables on all the assumed exogenous explanatory variables and the instruments. The second stage is the estimation of our main model including the predicted residuals obtained from the first stage as additional regressors (without excluding the potential endogenous variables). According to Rivers and Vuong (1988) , the usual t-statistic on the coefficient of the residuals is a valid test of the null hypothesis of exogeneity.
As instruments, we use the following ones: basicness of R&D, export intensity and the industry averages for each of the potentially endogenous variables at the two-digit industry level. With respect to the basic idea behind these instruments, basicness of R&D represents the extent to which the firm's R&D activity is directed towards basic research. According to Kamien and Zang (2000) firms for which the sources of basic R&D are more important for their innovation process are more likely to benefit from incoming spillovers. Therefore, we proxy the basicness of R&D performed by the firms through the variable that picks up the importance given to sources of information from universities or research institutes for the innovation processes. We expect this variable to be positively correlated not only with the score on incoming spillovers, but also with R&D intensity, in other words, the firm's absorptive capacity.
Turning to export intensity, this variable attempts to measure the extent of competition that firms face and we expect that it has a positive correlation with the use of protection methods.
The idea is that exporting firms, which typically face a more competitive environment, protect more their innovation given their higher reliance on protection methods (Arundel and Kabla, 1998; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002) .
Finally, industry level averages of incoming spillovers, legal protection and R&D intensity are included in order to pick up the effect of unobserved industry-specific characteristics related to the respective potentially firm-specific endogenous variable (Pakes, 1983; López, 2008) .
Although it must be admitted that it is likely that some of these instruments are not completely exogenous, we must highlight the difficulty to find suitable instruments in the kind of database used in this research, namely a survey, in which the number and type of variables available are given a priori. In addition, we must signal that the instruments chosen in this piece of research have been also considered in previous papers (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; López, 2008; Abramovsky et al., 2009; Chun and Mun, 2012) . In any case, in the next section we provide empirical evidence on the validity of our instruments. 
Results
With the aim of analysing the determinants of R&D cooperative agreements with different types of partners and seeing the differences between the industrial and service sectors, in a first stage we estimate a model for all firms in both sectors and include a sectoral dummy variable to control for unobserved determinants common to the sector. Afterwards, we perform the same estimation for the subsamples of industrial and service firms separately. In the latter, we also include industry dummies at the 2-digit level according to NACE-93.
Considering endogeneity
The endogeneity of the variables proxying for incoming spillovers, legal protection and R&D intensity is confirmed by applying the Rivers-Vuong test and calculating the Durbin-WuHausman endogeneity test (see Table 5 and Table A3 in the Appendix). In this approach the instruments must satisfy two conditions: relevance and exogeneity. The first condition can be tested on the basis of the first stage regressions shown in The second condition, the exogeneity of the instruments, is more complicated to test in the context of a multivariate probit model, because tests on the exogeneity of the instruments, such as the Sargan's test of overidentifying restrictions, have not been implemented for this kind of models. Nevertheless, in order to provide some evidence about such exogeneity, we compute the Sargan's test but in the framework of separate univariate probit models (Newey, 1987; Lee, 1992) . In this context, this is done by regressing the residuals from an instrumental probit model (a probit for each type of cooperation) on all instruments, where the joint null hypothesis states that the instruments are valid, that is, that they are uncorrelated with the error term, and that the exclusion of exogenous instruments is correct.
The results of the Sargan's tests of overidentifying restrictions (Table A5 in the Appendix)
reveal that the joint null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and, therefore, correctly excluded from the estimated equation, cannot be rejected neither for the whole sample nor for the manufacturing and service samples separately.
Therefore, these results point to the validity of the instruments used.
The estimated coefficients and their corresponding marginal effects of the second-stage are presented in Tables 5 and 6 , respectively. 12 Although the results without instrumenting are not reported here if compared with the results in Table 6 , we must admit that there are differences in some of the marginal effects, nevertheless, the main results are maintained. For instance, 11 Note that the partial R 2 of the first stage are very low and the value of the F-tests statistics are well above 10, which is usually considered a good threshold, and so the instruments cannot be judged as weak. 12 In order to adjust the coefficients' standard errors for the use of generated regressors we have obtained them through bootstrapping. the marginal effects of incoming spillovers and R&D intensity are higher in the estimations corrected by endogeneity problems, probably due to endogeneity biases or alternatively to measurement errors. As pointed out by Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) in the case of incoming spillovers, the problem may arise from the use of qualitative measures for which the estimates without correcting for endogeneity are biased towards zero. The downward bias can also reflect the impact of past cooperation on the importance to publicly available information for innovation since once the firm has engaged in cooperation agreements, it could place more importance to knowledge flows shared among partners than to other external sources of information. After instrumenting, we also find that the marginal effects of the legal protection variable are not significant any more, with the exception of the cases of vertical cooperation for the whole and the manufacturing samples, in which this variable presents a negative effect. Overall, our analysis on the endogeneity problem shows that it can affect the results on the determinants of R&D cooperation strategies and hence, our procedure, not only considering lagged explanatory variables but also performing a two-step estimation, allows us to mitigate the bias produced.
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 around here]
Determinants of cooperation strategies for innovation
The results of the estimations on the determinants of cooperation strategies for the whole sample, and by industrial and service sectors separately, reported in Table 5 , show that the error terms are positively and significantly correlated (ρ) across the different types of cooperation partners indicating the superiority of the multivariate probit model to the estimation of separated univariate probit models. In order to ease the analysis of the determinants of the different R&D cooperation strategies as well as the differences between the industrial and service sectors, we computed the marginal effects of each one of the explanatory variables (Table 6) .
In general terms, we can observe that the determinants of R&D cooperation differ among the different types of cooperation partners. This finding shows the heterogeneity in the motivations for carrying out the different types of cooperation, and points to the need of studying them separately. We also note a significant effect of the sector on the probability of cooperating with any partner. The statistical significance of the marginal effects associated with the variable sector in the model for the whole sample and the different effects observed in the separated estimates for industrial and service firms, highlight these sectoral differences.
We calculated a likelihood ratio test (LR) comparing the coefficients obtained for the full sample of firms with the ones obtained in the two separate subsamples (manufacturing and service firms). We obtained a test statistic of 67.42 which is above the critical value of the chi-squared with 89 degrees of freedom. So, we can conclude that there are significant differences between sectors in the sets of marginal effects. The negative sign of the sector variable in Table 6 shows that the probability of cooperating is lower for manufactures than for services, with much more pronounced differences in the case of horizontal cooperation (with competitors), while no significant differences are found between the two sectors in the case of vertical cooperation. These results are consistent with the descriptive statistics shown in Section 3. All in all, cooperation is less frequent in manufactures which can be related to the fact that in such sector legal protection methods are used more intensively. That is, cooperative innovation may be used as a substitute to patenting in the manufactures but not in services.
With respect to the main drivers of R&D cooperation, results show a positive and significant relationship between incoming spillovers and the likelihood of the three types of cooperation.
The higher the importance attributed by the firm to external sources of information, the more likely it is to obtain benefits through cooperation agreements (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; López, 2008) . This impact is significantly higher in the case of partnerships with research institutions, particularly in industrial firms: a higher importance given to publicly available information increases the probability of institutional cooperation by approximately 92 and 72 percentage points in the industrial and service sector, respectively. This result is in line with the theoretical argument given by Abramovsky et al. (2009) that firms which are able to get more benefits from external knowledge might be more likely to engage in cooperation agreements with the research base or, at least, with firms outside their own industry. So, it seems fair to conclude that industrial firms benefit the most from the information coming from external sources, especially with regard to cooperating with research institutions. This probably has to do with the basicness of the research carried out by research institutions and universities, which is more likely to be of direct relevance to manufacturing firms.
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The results for the legal protection variable, proxying for appropriability, show that it has a negative and significant effect on cooperation with suppliers or customers at the level of the whole sample and for industrial firms, but not in the rest of partnerships. This suggests that a higher use of legal protection methods may hamper the internalization of knowledge flows shared between manufacturing firms, in particular with suppliers or customers, and may thus decrease the probability of this kind of R&D cooperation agreements. In the case of the service sector we do not observe any significant effect. As mentioned by Abramovsky et al. (2009) , cooperation might be perceived as a substitute to protection methods such as patenting innovations in the industrial sector, whereas it may not be used as a substitute to formal protection methods such as trademarks and copyright in service firms. That is, a higher use of protection methods has a lower impact on R&D cooperation in the service sector than in manufacturing. In any case, we may highlight that this result is only valid for vertical cooperation, since in all other cases, there is not a significant effect, probably due to the ambiguity of the impact of appropriability.
Regarding R&D intensity, the results show that the higher internal R&D intensity, the higher likelihood of cooperation with suppliers or customers and research institutions, but only in the service sector. This positive result is consistent with the literature highlighting the fact that a higher absorptive capacity of a firm may allow it to derive greater benefits from cooperation with other partners (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) . However, we do not find internal R&D intensity to affect significantly such decisions in the industrial sector. A possible explanation for this might be that the magnitude of internal R&D expenditure over turnover (as shown in Table 3 ) is much lower in manufactures than in services.
As far as factors hampering innovation activities are concerned, the results show that costsharing is not a significant motivation for cooperation in the Spanish case. Additionally, when a higher importance is attributed to risk, we obtain a lower probability of institutional cooperation, with no significant impact in the case of the other two types of partners (vertical and horizontal cooperation) for manufactures. This negative effect is also found in Veugelers and Cassiman (2005) for Belgian industrial firms. These authors claim that given the specific characteristics of scientific knowledge, the relation between research institutions and industrial firms is characterized by a large amount of uncertainty and therefore a higher risk makes it more difficult to enforce partner compliance in cooperation agreements.
Another difference between the industrial and service sectors lies in the importance of the limitations related to the lack of qualified personnel (lack of HK). No significant effects are found for the whole sample, but when it is split into industrial and services the impacts are notable in the latter. A higher importance attributed by service firms to the lack of human capital increases the probability of any kind of cooperation by approximately 5 percentage points. This positive effect implies that firms see the possibility of accessing additional human resources through partnerships with other companies or institutions. In contrast, decisions on R&D cooperation in the industrial sector do not seem to be driven by a shortage of human resources. This result is probably related to the fact that innovation is more closely involved with worker skills in the service sector than in manufactures, where machine and equipment play a more important role in the innovation process (Baldwin, 1999) .
Public financial support from local, regional and national administrations is one of the main determinants of cooperation in the Spanish case in all its forms. The highest positive effect is found in the case of cooperation with research institutions, especially in the service sector. As shown in Table 6 , the probability of engaging in institutional cooperation in the service sector is around 21 percentage points higher among firms that receive public funding for innovation compared to non-receivers of such funding. This effect is notably greater than for the other types of partnership (the marginal effects are approximately 10 percentage points lower in the horizontal and vertical cooperation). This positive effect of public funding may be due to the fact that subsidies are often designed to encourage the interaction between businesses and research institutions. Moreover, companies that can alleviate financial problems by means of public funding are keener to cooperate with their competitors, perhaps because public funding is a factor that is outside the realm of competition (Tether, 2002) . In other words, there are reasons to believe that public support programs for R&D activities may ease cooperative innovation agreements by firms that would otherwise do not engage in such activity.
Finally, the results show that, in general, large companies are more likely to establish agreements for innovation without striking differences neither among types of partnerships nor between sectors. In both sectors, companies with more than 500 employees are most likely to cooperate with suppliers or customers (14 and 18 percentage points higher than SMEs in the industrial and the service sector, respectively), followed by cooperation with research institutions (10 and 9 percentage points higher in the industrial and the service sector, respectively). The ability of large firms to better reap the returns of cooperation agreements, thanks to the availability of a greater structure and resources to be able to face the commitment required in partnerships, would explain this higher probability of cooperating.
And therefore, the argument that small firms may cooperate more intensively because they may need such cooperation in order to manage innovation activities which otherwise could not carry out because of their limited resources seems not to be applicable for the Spanish case.
Interrelations between cooperation strategies
As mentioned in the previous section, the perturbation terms of the different equations, each one for one type of cooperation partner, were positively and significantly correlated, indicating that analysing all cooperation decisions simultaneously is much more efficient that analysing each one separately, in other words, the results of our multivariate probit model are more precise than the results from separate traditional probit models. The positive sign of such correlations may be due to the existence of certain unobserved factors influencing the choice of several types of cooperation in the same direction (e.g. managerial ability or the stock of tacit knowledge) and/or that the cooperation with one partner may drive the cooperation with another type.
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In this sense, in Table 7 we present the correlations between the R&D cooperation decisions in the data, between the disturbances terms of the different partnerships and between the unconditional probabilities predicted by our multivariate probit model. While the correlation coefficients of the perturbation terms provide evidence about the existence of interrelations between cooperation decisions due to common unobserved factors or complementarities, the correlations between the unconditional probabilities indicate that such interrelations are due to common observed factors.
14 As seen from Table 7 , all these coefficients of correlation are statistically significant and positive, with higher values in the case of the correlations between the unconditional probabilities, which indicate that the interrelations between the cooperation strategies decisions are mainly driven by common observed factors.
Finally, our model allows us to obtain the predicted conditional probabilities of engaging in a certain type of cooperation partnership given that another cooperation decision is made. The values of such probabilities are reported in Table 8 . The most striking conclusion from these results is that, on average, the probability of engaging in one type of cooperation is higher when another cooperation partnership has already been carried out simultaneously. For example, for industrial firms, the predicted probability of engaging in vertical cooperation, column P(V=1), if the firm also participates in institutional and horizontal cooperation projects is 79%, while this probability is only 13% when the firm does not participate in any other kind of cooperation agreement. Additionally, it is also important to point out that the predicted probability of carrying out cooperation with competitors (horizontal cooperation) when at least one other type of cooperation has been chosen is notably higher for service than industrial firms. That is, carrying out at least one type of cooperation facilitates the existence of cooperation with competitors in the service sector, whereas this relationship is less likely to occur among manufactures. This can be related to the lower competition present in services, leading them to cooperate more with competitors, and with a higher rate in the case of having the experience and the expertise provided by the fact of being already working cooperately in R&D projects with other types of partners.
Conclusions
This paper analysed the determinants in the choice of the different strategies of R&D cooperation (horizontal, vertical and institutional cooperation), with particular emphasis on the heterogeneities of their impact across the different strategies while explicitly considering the interrelations between them. Additionally, we tried to disentangle the differences between firms in the service and manufacturing sectors when choosing partners for R&D cooperation. Spanish firms tended to choose simultaneously several types of partners to carry out their innovation activities. Around 48% of the enterprises that decided to cooperate did so with at least two types of partners, and almost 14% cooperated with the three types of partners at a time. The most common partner was research institutions, and it was most frequently matched with partnerships with suppliers and/or customers. Statistical tests suggested that the choice of the type of partner is not independent one from another, pointing to the need for a multiequation estimation that considers the interdependences between the three cooperation strategies. In fact, the econometric estimates obtained using a multivariate probit model corroborated the validity of this method compared with univariate estimations.
Related to the drives of R&D cooperation we confirmed that, in the case of Spanish firms, incoming spillovers were an important determinant of the choice of cooperating with any type of partner, regardless of the sector, but this impact was significantly higher in the case of partnerships with research institutions and universities. This result is consistent with the notion that firms which are able to get more benefits from external knowledge might be more likely to engage in cooperation agreements with the research base or, at least, with firms outside their own industry. Similarly, public funding also played a key role in the firms' decisions to cooperate, especially when the partners are research institutions. This may be related to the fact that much of the public funding for innovation aims to encourage and promote knowledge transfer from research institutions to companies. Results also show that large firms are more likely to cooperate with all types of partner than small firms, highlighting the fact that large firms are more likely to face the commitment required in partnerships and better reap the returns of cooperation agreements.
The differences found among the main determinants of R&D cooperation across sectors are also of great interest. In the case of Spanish firms, there was a greater propensity to cooperate in the service sector (40%) than in manufactures (31%). Additionally, this lower probability of R&D cooperation for manufactures was more pronounced in the case of horizontal cooperation (with competitors). This can be related with previous findings suggesting that in the manufacturing sector, for which legal protection methods are in general more important than for the service sector, cooperation may act as a substitute to legal protection through patenting. With respect to the effects of factors hampering innovations activities, a higher importance attributed to risk makes manufactures less likely to enter cooperation agreements with research institutions while in the service sector this factor is less important in influencing this type of cooperation. On the other hand, the need to address shortfalls of human resources to carry out innovations activities via cooperation agreements with different kinds of partners is an important factor for service firms but not for manufactures. Firms in the service sector see cooperation agreements as an effective way to enhance and complement their human resources for carrying out R&D activities. These differences are presumably due to sectoral differences in the orientation of innovations in industrial and services firms, since, for instance, innovation is more closely involved with worker skills in the services sector than in manufactures, where machine and equipment play a more important role in the innovation process (Baldwin, 1999) . Finally, using legal protection methods reduces the probability of cooperating with suppliers and customers in the case of manufactures. This can be due to the fact that legal protection methods may hamper the internalization of knowledge flows shared between firms.
All in all, this paper has given evidence on the differences observed in the determinants of R&D cooperation agreements among the different types of partnership and also across different sectors, which should be taken into account when designing policies that aim to encourage R&D cooperation as a means of increasing innovation in firms. In other words, the extent to which the motives for cooperation vary with different partners, which has been observed to be especially different in the case of R&D cooperation agreements with research institutes or universities, should be considered when policy makers decide the targets of their R&D policies, if they aim to maximise the impact of public funding. In this sense, it seems sensitive for public administrations to seek ways of directing a higher proportion of their funding towards firms that have the potential to gain significant benefits from working cooperatively in R&D projects with universities. 
Likelihood Test
Chi-sq(3) = 1593.5 Chi-sq(3) = 853.5 Chi-sq(3) = 740.2
Ho: ρ21=ρ31=ρ32=0 Pval = 0.000 Pval = 0.000 Pval = 0.000 ( ) Bootstrapped standard errors. / indicates instrumented. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Estimations of the industrial and service samples include industry dummies at 2-digit level according to NACE-93. , and are respectively the predicted residuals of the incoming spillovers, legal protection and R&D intensity. 
